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r:;J THE SUPRE}1E C0URT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

LAYTON CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Case No. 16659

vs.
FERRIN DOUGLAS GLINES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The appellant, Ferrin Douglas Glines, was convicted
before the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, in and for
Layton, Utah of the crime of Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol, in violation of Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code.

Upon appeal to the Second Judicial District

Court, that judgement of conviction was upheld by the Honorable
J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, presiding.

From that judgement of

conviction, the defendant brings this direct appeal pursuant
to the terms and provisions of Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah solely and expressly to test
the Constitutional validity and construction of Layton Mun, cin"l Code 41-6-44.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPOSITion IM THE

LO~ffi~

COURT

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the
crime of Driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation
of Layton Municipal Code, Section 41-6-44.

Subsequently, the

trial court sentenced appeallant to serve a term of six-month:
in the Davis County Jail.

RELIEF SOUGHT on APPEAL

Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment
of the trial court upon grounds that Section 41-6-44, Layton
Municipal Code is invalid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
in the Layton Circuit Court on Monday, May 7, 1979 at the hour
of 10: 00 o'clock a .m. before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornabi
Circuit Court Judge.

The matter was before the Court for tri•

of the defendant for the offense of D. U. I.
prosecuted under a Layton City Ordinance.

The matter was
At the conclusion

of evidence in the matter, Defendant moved the Court to dismi;:
the matter upon grounds that Layton City lacks Constitutional·
or statutory authority to enact a D. U. I. ordinance.

Subsequef!

to oral argument, the Court denied such Motion and Defendant
was there upon convicted of the offense of D. U. I. under Layt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Municipal Code, Section 41-6-44 and sentenced to a term of
six-months in the Davis County Jail.

From that Judgement

of conviction, Defendant brought direct Appeal to the Second
Judicial District Court, the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer presiding.
On August 9, 1979, the Court affirmed Mr. Glines conviction.
From that final judgement. Defendant brings this direct appeal.

-3-
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ARGUMEllT
POINT I

SECTION 41-6-44, LAYTOM HlHTICIPAL CODE IS
INVALID SINCE MUNICIPALITIES ARE NOT EMPOWERED
BY STATUTE TO ENACT ORDINANCES PROHIBITING D.U
In the matter now before the Court, the Defendant,
Ferrin Douglas Glines, was charged by Complaint with the
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor
in violation of Section 41-6-44 of the Revised Ordinances ~
Layton City.

Section 41-6-44 was enacted pursuant to the

authority conferred upon the City of Layton and other Municipalities by statute and, specifically, by Utah Code An·
notated

Section 41-6-43 providing, in pertinent part, as foL
(a)

Local authorities may by ordinance provide
that it shalll be unlawful for any person
who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or is an habitual user or under the
influence of any narcotic drugs or any other
drug to a degree which rendered him incapable
of safely driving a vehicle to drive or be
in actual physical control of any vehicle,
for the use of chemical tests and for evidentiary pre-sumptions, and for penalties .
therefore as a first offense consistent with
Section 41-6-44.

The above-cited statute was repealed by the Utah Stati
Legislature (Laws 1978, Ch. 33, Section 54) on Januarv 28,
1978, effective March 30, 1978, and said repeal of the stat·

utory authority to enact D.U.I. or d.inances, De f en d a nt urges
•
· d o~~r
operates to invalidate Section 41-6-44 o f the R,evise
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of Layton City.

(The Section has since been re-enacted but
-4-

such re-enactment was not effective untill July 1, 1979)
It is well established as a matter of law in this
jurisdiction that municipalities possess none of the elements
of Sovereignty and that they are" creatures of statute", i.e.
that they possess only those powers conferred upon them by
the State of Utah or by statutory enactment.

Nasfell v.

Ogden City, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 507 (1952); Salt Lake
City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504,124 P. 2d 537 (1942); Moss v.
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,

Utah 2d 60,

261 P. 2d 234 (1923); Lark v. Whitehead, 28 Utah 2d 343, 502
p 2d 557 (1972).
In Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 507
(1952) the Supreme Court of Utah stated that:
We are committed to the principle that
cities have none of the elements of sovereignty,
that "any fair, reasonable substantial doubt
concerning the existence of the power is resolved
by the Courts against the corporation (city)
and the power denied .... That grants of power
to cities are strictly construed to the exclusion
of implied powers not reasonably necessary in
carrying out the purposes of the express powers
granted.
(249 P. 2d at 508)
In

~Tasfell,

the Court held that Ogden had no power to

pass an "ordinance declaring the presence of a vehicle, parked
in violation of any ordinance, on any public street in the city,
prima f acie evidence that the registered owner of such vehicle
committed or authorized such violation ..... "
In Salt' Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P. 2d
537 (1942), the Defendant was charged with the violation of a
·.:1ty

ordinance which prescribed the hours during which barber

shops could
remain open. In striking down the ordinance the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-5-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

Court said:
I~ has been :e~eatedly stated by this
Court that a municipal corporation oosse
.
an d can exercise
t h e f allowing
powers, and sses<·
other;
First, those granted in express wo~
sec?nd. those necessarily or fairly implied i~,
or.incident to the powers expressly grant~;
third, those essential to the accomplishment
of the d7clared objects and purposes of the
corporation, ... not simply convenient but
indispensible."
(124) P. 2d at 538)

The above principles have been consistently strictly
construed by the Utah Supreme Court.
ex rel.

In Moss, County Attorm

State Tax Conunission v. Board of Commissioners of

Salt Lake City, et al, Utah 2d 60 261 P. 2d 961 (1953), the
Court reiterated:
This Court has not favored the extention
of the powers of the city by implication, and
the only modification of such doctrine is when
the power is one which is necessarily implied.
Unless this requirement is met, the power
cannot be deduced from any consideration of
convenience of necessity, or desirability of
such result, and no doubtful influence from
other powers granted or from ambiguous or
uncertain provisions of the law would be
.
sufficient to sustain such authority. (citation
omitted) (216 P. 2d at 964)
In Layton City v. Speth, Supra, a case in which counsi
for Defendant personally participated,

the Utah Supreme Gour:

in striking down a city ordinance, again stated:
r.rants of nower to cities are strictlv construe~I
to the exclusion of implied powers (578 P. 2d ,_
The above cited cases and authoritv to the contrarv n.·
withstanding, it is believed that Respondent will attempt t:
rely heri=dn uoon the case of Salt Lake Citv v. ~ ;, ·9?Uc
133,

93~,

P. 2d 671 (1939)

S.L.C. v. Kusse was a
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1939 decision in which the Utah Supreme Court held that municipalities
have authority pursuant to a general powers statute ( U.C.A. 15-8-84,
now U.C.A. 10-8-84) to enact a D.U.I. ordinance.

Appeallant believes

that Respondent's reliance is misplaced.
To begin, Kusse predates the repealed enabling statute, U.C.A.
41-6-43, by two years.
in 1941.

Section 41-6-43, U.C.A. was first enacted

Kusse came down in 1939.

Secondly,41-6-43 was a specific

legislative grant of authority to enact D.U.I. ordinances, whereas
the Section construed in Kusse , 15-8-84 (now 10-8-84), was a general
oowers ordinance.

The clear thrust of all of the above cited cases

and authority is that a specific grant of authority controls and
delimits a general grant and, by implication, where the specific
authority has been expressly repealed one cannot ressurrect it
under the guise of general authority.

Thus, although one might

subsume the power to enact D.U.I. ordinances under a general oowers
statute as this Court once did in Kusse , once there has been a
specific grant of such authority and then such specific grant
has been repealed, as here, by the State Legislature , the only
reasonable conclusion available is that the legislature intended
to preempt thereby the authority of municipalities to enact D.U.I.
ordinances.

Further, counsel submits that all cases herein cited

postdate Kusse on the issue of the authority of cities to enact
ordinances and to the extent that Kusse conflicts
cases or seems

with such

to conflict with such cases, its ruling has been

clearly and expressly modified or even overuled by such cases.
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Applying the rationale of the above-cited cases and
authority to the facts in the instant case, it is clear that
the Layton City Ordinance must fall since the statutory author::
for the enactment of said ordinance has been repealed.

Absent

an express statutory grant of authority, the law is well settle.
in this jurisdiction

that municipalities lack the authority

to enact and enforce crimminal ordinances. The policy of this
restrictive interpretation as stated in Nasfell is both sou~
and well settled.

"The rule promotes a wholesome, uniform orde:.

amoung the municipalities of the state.

Its wisdom is not ooe~.

to question at this date, and we ought not depart from it light:
( 249 P. at 509)

POINT II
SECTION 41-6-44, LAYTON MUNICIPAL CODE, IS INVALID
SINCE THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS EFE
IVELY PREEMPTED THAT AREA OF LEGISLATION.
Layton City is further prohibited from enacting and enforcing Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, in the instant
case, on the theory of pre-emption.

Layton City effectively

intrudes upon the area of legislative enactment pre-emted by
the State of Utah pursuant to Section 41-6-44. U.C.A., (1953),
which prohibits Driving Under the Influence and which, by recen:
revision, punishes said offense as a Class "A" ~isdemeanor
under certain circumstances.
In a case involving prostitution, Salt Lake City v.

~

10 Utah 2d 254, 430 Pd2d 371 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court he::
that where the State has enacted comprehensive an d comp
Sponsored by the S.J.to
Quinney
Funding for digitization
provided by
the Institute of Museum and
Library Services
pertaining
anLaw Library.
offense,
it has
pre-empted
the
field.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

lete la•
The

co:

further held that a Municipality or City has authority to en;i_-:".
Jrdinances only in those areas where the State has given authoritv and a
specific grant of authority is not grounds to argue that a city
may also prohibit the same conduct.

As stated in Sutter; supra:

It may he, and is, contended that the ordinance
in 9uestion is only carrying out the general
policy of the state as reflected by the legislative
enactment making it an offense against the state
law for any person to knowingly have in his possession
without authority intoxicating liquors within the
state. But the policy of the state cannot control
in determining the powers of a municioalitv.
(216 P. 2d at 237)
·
·
Applying the above-cited rationale, the Utah Supreme
Court recently struck down a city ordinance prohibiting possession
of a controlled substance.

In the decision in Layton City v.

Speth, Supra, the Court specifically noted that Municipalities
are empowered only to enact ordinances creating offenses punishable
as Class "B" Misdemeanors whereas the State has authority to
affix more serious penalties for violations of its statutes.

Thus,

where the £ity and State have both enacted laws proscribing certain
conduct, the Court notes, the fact that the State has set forth
a penalty for the offense that exceeds the penalty that the City
might lawfully impose, consitutes an indication that the State
has intended to pre-empt the field and renders the City Ordinance
invalid.
In its decision, the Court, Chief Justice,Ellett
speaking said:
The State of Utah has enacted statutes controlling
the sale, gift, or use of controlle~ substances.
Subsection (2) (a) (ii) of U.C.A., 1953, 58-37-8
contain the exact language of the ordinance ~et
out above. The City had not power or authority
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
providedordinance.
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the
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If the City could enact an ordinance cov .
the same offenses as those set out in the sta~~~n
the:e would be a problem. A violation of the ·
ordii;.ance would only be a misdemeanor punishable
by fine not to exceed six months while the state
statute declares the offense to be punishable a
follows:
s
(a) For the first offense, a fine of
$299.00 or jail not to exceed six months, or both;
(b) For the second offense, a fine of
$1, 000. 00 or jail not to exceed one year, or both'
(c) For the third or subsequent conviction
imprisionment in the Utah State Prison for not '
more than five years.
The City ordinance penalty would apply to
a person who was a multiple off ender as well as
to a first offender for the ordinance applies
simply to anyone who knowingly permits his car
to be occupied by persons using controlled
substances therein.
The conviction of Mr. Speth for violating
that ordinance must be set aside.
The judgment
is reversed.
No costs are awarded. (378 P. 2d at
Applying the above cited authority to the instant
case, it is clear that the legislature intended at the time oft·;
repeal of 41-6-43, to pre-empt municipalities from the field of
D.U.I. legislation.

This is apparent since (1) the enabling

statute was expressly repealed, and (2) the state has chosen
to punish D. U. I. in certain instances as a Class "A" Misdemeanc:
and said penalty is beyond the authority of cities to enact.
CONCLUSION
Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, is invalic
since Municipalities are not empowered by Statute to enact
ordinances prohibiting Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
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Further, Section 41-6-44. Layton Municipal Code, is
invalid since the Legislature of the State of Utah has effectively preempted that area of legislation.

For such reasons,

this Court should reverse the verdict and judgment of the trial
and appellate courts, declaring therewith that Layton
Municipal Code 41-6-44 is constitutionally invalid.

Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellant was
duly served on counsel for the Respondent, Bruce C. Barton,
Layton City Attorney, 437 North Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah,
by hand delivering three (3) copies thereof this

\~~

day of

tfovember, 1979.
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